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The Effects of the Foreign Direct Investment 




Pakistan for many years maintained strict controls on foreign direct 
investment.  However, over the past decade controls on foreign investment in 
manufacturing have diminished sharply, though less so for the service sector.  The 
government continues to impose restrictions on foreign trade, which adversely affect 
foreign direct investors in several ways. Nonetheless, Pakistan has moved a 
substantial distance toward liberalising direct foreign investment. 
There are two obvious policy issues related to foreign investment raised by 
these developments.   First, should Pakistan proceed further toward liberalisation and 
at what pace?  Second, with a liberalised investment sector, should Pakistan become 
an active protagonist among developing countries for a multilateral agreement on 
investment?   
This paper explores the macroeconomic effects of foreign direct investment 
liberalisation on developing countries that have yet to substantially and fully 
liberalise. The principal focus will be on relatively short term effects—those changes 
that will occur between one and five years after liberalisation, although long-term 
effects are also discussed. Unfortunately, very little is known about the repercussions 
of foreign direct investment liberalisation on host economies. There is a rich 
literature on the effects of trade policy liberalisation on macroeconomic variables. 
Considerable scholarly work has been done on the impact of foreign direct 
investment on host economies under existing investment regimes. However, for a 
variety of reasons discussed below the link between investment liberalisation and 
macroeconomic performance has received scant attention from researchers.     
This study summarises a few pieces of this small body of research on foreign 
direct investment, but this only takes us part of the way.  As Sebastian Edwards 
noted in a recent study, “applied economists often ask too much of their data sets, 
and try to extract information that is simply not there” [Edwards (1993)]. With that 
caveat in mind, the paper takes two approaches to achieving its stated purpose of 
exploring the macroeconomic effects of investment liberalisation. One is to review 
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the literature on trade liberalisation’s in an effort to extract implications that those 
studies may have for investment liberalisation. The second approach is to utilise a 
large-scale simulation model to examine the repercussions of investment changes on 
macroeconomic variables.  Neither approach is totally satisfactory, but together they 
provide some insight into the investment liberalisation process.   
For the purposes of this paper, an investment regime will refer to the array of 
policies directly affecting the profitability of investments.  These policies fall into 
one of three categories: (1) fiscal incentives and disincentives; (2) investment 
restrictions; and  (3) trade policies.  Fiscal incentives refer to the cash grants, 
subsidised loans, accelerated depreciation allowances, tax holidays and other 
inducements that governments use to encourage investment. Fiscal disincentives 
include taxes on corporate profits and income remittances abroad. Investment 
restrictions are the limitations that governments impose on investment.  Some of 
these are explicit and automatic:  investment in certain industrial sectors is allowed or 
forbidden.  Some are subjective and discretionary: investment proposals must be 
approved by government agencies whose criteria may not be transparent. Trade 
policies include import duties, quotas and export subsidies that affect the price of 
traded goods and the profitability of investments.  While many other policies 
influence the investment climate, these policy groups have the most direct bearing on 
investment profitability.   
 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGIMES NEED A MEASURE 
One critical lacuna in the literature is a comprehensive measure of the 
restrictiveness of investment regimes. Edwards notes in his survey of the effects of 
trade liberalisation on developing countries that the emergence of the concept of the 
effective rate of protection in the early 1960s made possible large-scale studies of the 
protective effects of trade policies both across countries and over time [Edwards 
(1993), p. 1362].  Without a comprehensive measure of the impact that all trade 
policies—i.e. those affecting capital, intermediate and final goods—have on the 
profitability of investments, economists had to rely on partial. And very imperfect, 
measures of  the restrictiveness of trade policy regimes. The emergence of the 
effective rate concept represented a mini-paradigm shift in the way economists and 
policy-makers viewed trade policy and, importantly, the reforms that were needed. 
Investment regimes lack an analogous measure of net incentive. Of the three 
policy components that make up an investment regime, only one—trade policy—has 
a quantitative measure—the effective rate of protection. Theorists have made 
progress in providing an analogous measure for fiscal incentives. Eric Bond and 
Stephen Guisinger [Bond and Guisinger (1985)] incorporated incentives in an 
expanded version of the effective rate of protection to show that when Ireland joined 
the EEC, the government compensated investors in Ireland from incentives lost when Effects of the Foreign Direct Investment Liberalisation 
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Ireland adopted the EEC’s common tariff by increasing fiscal incentives.  Guisinger 
showed that the effective rate of protection, the user cost of capital and the ratio of 
the financial to the economic rate of return are all logically related [Guisinger 
(1989)]. Any one of these three indices could be used to measure the net incentive 
(fiscal incentives less fiscal disincentives) provided by a host government to 
investors.    
The greatest need is the quantification of investment restrictions.  It does not 
appear to be an insuperable problem from the standpoint of theory. A host 
government’s denial of right of establishment is analogous to a prohibitive tariff or a 
zero import quota. A host government’s non-national treatment of foreigners imposes 
costs on the inward flow of capital in much the same way a tariff raises the cost of 
imported goods. Lack of convertibility (or the risk that a currency might become 
inconvertible) raises costs to investors. There is no fundamental reason that 
researchers could not devise tariff-equivalents for restriction-induced costs. Perhaps 
the greatest challenge to theory is the representation of the deterrent effect of an 
investment approval agency using subjective criteria.  
The real problems lie in empirical estimation. Data on investment restriction 
costs are much more difficult to collect than costs imposed by trade policies because of 
differences in the way restrictive policies are applied. Within the same industry, tariffs 
and quotas apply uniformly to all importers, so that only one piece of information is 
needed for each imported product. For example, all quota holders reap the same benefit 
from the quota-constrained supply of imports and each holder raises the domestic 
selling price above the c.i.f. price by the same amount.  In contrast, investment 
restrictions are often imposed on a project-by-project basis even within the same 
industry or product category. No two investors in the same narrowly defined industrial 
category face exactly the same set of restrictions or incentives. Amassing reliable data 
on a project-by-project, identifying the dozen or more restrictions and incentives that 
apply to the typical investment in developing countries is a daunting task.  
While it would be incorrect to say that we know nothing about the degree of 
restrictiveness, our knowledge is largely qualitative and subjective. As a result, 
comparisons of the degree of restrictiveness across countries and across time are 
difficult. It is easy to understand why so few studies have attempted to examine the 
effects of investment liberalisation on macroeconomic variables.     
 
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM TRADE LIBERALISATIONS? 
In the absence of studies of the macroeconomic repercussions of investment 
liberalisation, we can look to other policy liberalisation experiences for lessons they 
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liberalisation comes closest to resembling investment liberalisation, since both 
produce increases in imports and exports. One could argue that investment 
liberalisations and trade liberalisations are mirror images of one another: investment 
liberalisations free capital inflow which gives rise to new imports and exports, while 
trade liberalisations free imports and exports which give rise to new capital inflows. 
Imports, exports and capital investment expand following both types of 
liberalisations  
The link between trade, capital and growth has been made in a number of 
other research studies. Robert E. Baldwin [Baldwin (1992)] has emphasised, for 
example, that capital accumulation from both domestic and foreign sources 
contributes significantly to the effects of trade liberalisation on output. Brad De Long 
and Lawrence Summers found a very strong link between investment in equipment 
and economic growth [De Long and Summers (1993)]. Although perhaps of smaller 
significance in developing countries than in developed  countries because of the vast 
range of experience with growth rates, the link is nonetheless evident from the data 
and the line of causation appears to run from equipment investment to growth and 
not vice versa.  For those developing countries producing few capital goods, 
equipment investment can only rise from liberalised imports. This is another way in 
which trade liberalisation and investment liberalisation are tied together. De Long 
and Summers find net social rates of return to capital investment averaging in the 
range of 25 percent. Although De Long and Summers do not examine foreign direct 
investment directly, it is evident that to the extent lower investment restrictions 
permit greater amounts of foreign direct investment, their data support a strongly 
positive link between foreign direct investment and economic growth. 
The literature on trade liberalisation is vast. However, there have been three 
large-scale, multi-country studies of trade liberalisation. These studies involved large 
numbers of researchers over several years examining interrelationships between 
trade, protection and economic performance. The first of the three, sponsored by the 
OECD and directed by Ian Little and Maurice Scott, took more than four years to 
complete, produced seven book-length studies of developing countries and 
culminated in the landmark summary volume, Trade and Industry  in Some 
Developing Countries [Little et al. (1970)]. Anne Krueger and Jagdish Bhagwati 
directed the second study under the sponsorship of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  It took more than three years to complete and included more than a dozen 
country studies. Anne Krueger prepared the summary volume, Foreign Trade 
Regimes and Economic Development: Liberalisation Attempts and Consequences 
[Krueger (1978)]. The last of the three, and perhaps most ambitious of all, was 
sponsored by the World Bank and appeared in five volumes under the generic 
heading, Liberalising Foreign Trade.  The study took more than five years to reach Effects of the Foreign Direct Investment Liberalisation 
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completion and covered eighteen developing countries.  A summary was prepared by 
the three study directors,  Demetris Papageorgiou, Armeane Choksi and Michael 
Michaely, under the title, Liberalising Foreign Trade in Developing Countries: The 
Lessons of Experience  [Papageorgiou et al. (1990)]. It is interesting to note that 
while the principal theme of these studies was trade policy, they did examine other 
related reforms, including capital markets and foreign investment regulations. All 
three studies are surveyed by Edwards (1993).  
It is unfair to try to capture the richness of these studies in just a few 
paragraphs.  However, while the three covered much the same ground, each focused 
on a different aspect of the liberalisation process. The OECD study took a snapshot 
picture of the trade protection system and explored the consequences of observed 
differences in inter-country and inter-industry rates of effective protection for the 
growth of industry, trade and the overall economy. The NBER study studied changes 
in trade policy regimes over time. The authors posited a five-step evolutionary 
process. In Phase 1, countries impose across-the-board quantitative controls.  In 
Phase 2, uniformity disappears as the system becomes more complex and 
discriminatory. In Phase 3, liberalisation begins with a few tentative measures.  In 
Phase 4, liberalisation proceeds in earnest. Phase 5 culminates with complete 
liberalisation from quota restrictions (though not tariff protection).   
The World Bank study concentrated on the consequences of liberalisation 
episodes on various macroeconomic variables and for that reason has the greatest 
relevance for the present study.  The Bank project had several objectives within this 
concentration.  First, were the effects of liberalisation different in the short and long 
term—for employment levels, growth, the balance of payments and income 
distribution?   Second, were the costs in any time frame—short or long—so great in 
relation to benefits that liberalisation should not have been undertaken?  Some of the 
other study objectives are suggestive about the appropriate types of investment 
reforms.  For example, is there an optimal sequencing of policies in the liberalisation 
process—i.e. quota liberalisation first before all others?  Was fiscal contraction a 
necessary adjunct to trade liberalisation?  Were there common factors that explained 
liberalisation failures?  Each of these is examined below after a general review of the 
findings of the study, which relies heavily on [Papageorgiou et al. (1990)]. 
The Bank study covered 19 countries, which together had 36 different 
episodes of liberalisation.  Episodes were classified according to whether they were 
“weak” (e.g. small reductions in tariffs or only a small number of sectors liberalised) 
or “strong”. The authors measured performance outcome according to whether 
liberalisation was sustained, partially sustained or completely reversed. Of the 36 
episodes, 24 were either fully or partially sustained; 12 ended in failure. These 36 
episodes were divided about evenly between weak and strong. One interesting Stephen Guisinger  408 
finding was that both weak and strong liberalisations produced sustained 
liberalisations. Interestingly, a country’s failure in one episode was not a good 
predictor of failure in subsequent episodes. Of thirteen countries that experienced an 
initial failure, eleven made a subsequent attempt, of which ten were successful to 
some degree (sustained fully or partially).        
One of the unique contributions of the study was to examine the sequencing of 
 trade policy reforms. Was it better, for example, to relax quantitative restrictions 
before reducing tariffs? The answer revealed by the study was an unambiguous 
“yes”. The failure rate for liberalisations that did not first relax quantitative 
restrictions was almost 90 percent, the same as the success rate of those that did. 
Thus, care in planning the sequencing of policy liberalisations appears important.   
Another finding was that the macroeconomic policy adopted by liberalising 
countries mattered.  The study found that “expansionary fiscal and monetary policies 
are the single most important cause of a reversal of trade reforms” [Papageorgiou et 
al. (1990), p. 22]. In other words, governments that liberalised experienced, in many 
cases, short term reductions in revenues as tariffs were lowered. The rush to import 
worsened the current account of the balance of payments and in general added to 
inflationary pressures in the economy. A restrictive monetary and fiscal policy was 
necessary to offset these initial shocks; in the longer run, it was found that both 
policies could be gradually relaxed. 
The study also looked at the reverse effect: what impact does fiscal policy 
have on trade reforms? The authors concluded that an expansionary fiscal policy 
made it difficult for countries to launch trade reforms. In other words, a precondition 
for trade reform was sound fiscal and monetary policy.   
The broad results can be summed up this way:   
  1. There are no systematic adverse effects from trade liberalisation and the 
costs of any required adjustments are small. 
  2.  If anything, trade reforms promote competition, stable prices and 
employment in the long term. 
  3. Stronger reforms implemented quickly appear to be more sustainable than 
weak ones. 
  4. One of the surest guarantors of the smooth implementation of trade 
liberalisation is a politically stable regime pursuing sound monetary and 
fiscal policies. 
 
Table 1 summarises these points and offers conjectures on their implications Effects of the Foreign Direct Investment Liberalisation 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of Trade Reforms and Implications for Investment Reforms 
  Trade Reforms 
Possible  Implications for 
Investment Reforms 
Does the Strength of the 
Reform Matter? 
Positive Effect on 
Outcome 
Perhaps Stronger Trade 
Reforms Better for 
Investment Reforms 
Does an Initial Failure 
Produce More Failures? 
No No 
 
Is the Proper Sequencing of 
Policies Important? 











What Affect does Reform 





Is a Sound Initial 
Macroeconomic Climate 




Did Agreements with 
Outsiders Play a Role? 
No Effect one Way or 
Other 
Yes, to Initiate and Sustain 
 
Political Stability  Yes  Yes 
 
 
One small part of the study was devoted to the study of sequencing trade and 
capital market reforms, including liberalisation of foreign direct investment.  The 
authors argue that trade should be liberalised before capital markets for three 
principal reasons.  First, the turbulence created by capital market reforms might delay 
trade reforms.  Second, if capital markets are reformed first, capital may flow to the 
most highly distorted and least efficient industries.   Finally, if capital reforms are 
implemented first, then trade reforms might be endangered by a large and sudden 
influx of foreign capital.  This influx would drive up the exchange rate, hurting 
exports and increasing the demand for imports.  This imbalance would provide an 
additional woe of policy-makers who would have enough on their plate with trade 
reforms. Effects of the Foreign Direct Investment Liberalisation 
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In only four of the thirty-six episodes studied were trade reforms accompanied 
by capital market reforms.  These episodes included the reforms in Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay and Israel.  In all four cases, trade reforms resulted in large inflows of 
capital, and in  the three Latin American cases, these inflows led to strong currency 
appreciations.  Once the capital inflows stopped, sharp depreciations of the currency 
followed.      
One final part of the study worth noting relates to income distribution. 
Because of the many factors that contribute to income distribution, the authors found 
it difficult to devise a theoretical case why trade reforms would necessarily improve 
income distribution.  Trade reforms would unleash many forces, some of which 
would operate in opposite directions on wages and incomes of the lower income 
groups.  The empirical evidence from the 36 episodes was also mixed.    The authors 
note that since devaluations accompanying trade reforms normally raise incomes of 
workers in the manufacturing and traded goods sectors relative to incomes in the 
service sectors, some improvement in income distribution should occur.  This 
assumes that the prior trade policies resulted in an overvalued exchange rate, 
depressing incomes in the tradeable goods sectors.   
 
LIBERALISATION OF TRADE AND CAPITAL: 
A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY 
One recent evaluation by Tosun Aricanli and Dani Rodrik [Aricanli and 
Rodrik (1990)] of the 1980-84 Turkish liberalisation confirmed a number of the 
conclusions emphasised in the World Bank study, but at the same time went further 
in underscoring the need for policy credibility. In the late 1970s, Turkey faced, as did 
many other developing countries, a debt crisis of major proportions.  In January 1980 
Turkey initiated a new exchange rate policy that produced a real devaluation of the 
Lira of over 50 percent by 1987. In line with the World Bank’s findings on the 
characteristics of successful liberalisations, the government introduced austerity 
measures that dried up the home market, leaving manufacturers no alternative but to 
export. The government launched an export promotion campaign, backed by tax 
rebates and other subsidies. The government reformed public enterprises and 
announced a plan to privatise public holdings throughout the economy. Various 
financial liberalisations were put into place, in particular the deregulation of interest 
rates resulting in positive real interest rates for the first time in many years. In 1984, 
imports were liberalised by adopting a negative list, although tariffs were increased 
several times to provide new revenues.   
At the same time as the general financial liberalisation, the government began 
to unwind restrictions that had severely limited foreign direct investment: the Stephen Guisinger  412 
approval process was simplified and other  bureaucratic impediments removed. And 
liberalisation efforts were intensified in 1985-86 when, according to Aricanli and 
Rodrik, all “conceivable disincentives” to foreign investment were eliminated. The 
result of these reforms was marked success in achieving greater exports and almost 
total failure in attracting foreign investment. One reason lay in the danger that the 
Bank study pointed to: simultaneous liberalisations can spell trouble. However, in the 
case of Turkey, investment reform did not result in exchange-rate-appreciating 
inflows of capital.  No capital flowed in.  
Aricanli and Rodrik explained the shortfall in capital inflow this way: 
“Foreign investors continued to doubt the durability of reforms and the stability of 
the financial system” [Aricanli and Rodrik (1990), p. 1348]. In other words, policy 
credibility was not achieved. While the reforms were sustained in the Bank’s 
terminology, they were not viewed as stable by investors. The government tinkered 
constantly with tariffs, tax rates, controls and other measures trying to fine tune the 
reforms. The constant tinkering planted seeds of doubt in the minds of foreign 
investors that no amount of success in other areas, such as exports, could overcome. 
 
INVESTMENT REFORMS AND LONG-TERM 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The focus of the research reviewed above was on the liberalisation process 
and its impact on prices, employment and growth in the short term.  All of the studies 
concluded that liberalisation would improve the allocation of resources and increase 
the prospects for sustained economic growth but none demonstrated it.  It would be 
hard in empirical research to separate out the many factors that contribute to 
economic growth and show that liberalisation was linked to one or more of these 
factors. As noted earlier in this paper, no good empirical measures of investment 
regimes and investment liberalisation exist, so linking a very qualitative concept to 
quantitative data on growth is problematical if not chimerical.   
Since a direct attack on this question is ruled out, two indirect approaches can 
be pursued. First, since liberalisation of foreign investment has a high probability of 
increasing exports, how does long term economic growth benefit from exports? 
Second, what does modern growth theory have to say on the issue of capital 
accumulation and especially foreign investment.   
The first question is surveyed by Edwards [Edwards (1993)] and he concludes 
that while substantial evidence exists to link export growth to economic growth, the 
issue is far from settled.  In particular, Edwards finds that most studies have specified 
regression equations without the benefit of an underlying model theoretically linking 
exports to growth.  Plainly, exports are a component of demand.  Increases in this or Effects of the Foreign Direct Investment Liberalisation 
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any other component will produce higher rates of growth. But the authors surveyed 
by Edwards  feel that exports provide an additional impetus to growth, perhaps 
stemming from positive externalities. Edwards finds the evidence on the externalities 
issue mixed and a fruitful area for further research. 
The second question goes directly to modern economic growth theory.  Paul 
Romer [Romer (1989)] has provided a theoretical basis for establishing a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between openness and growth [Edwards (1993), p. 1389]. 
Romer argues that where firms use capital, labour and a large number of specialised 
inputs, firms can either engage in production of final goods or devote resources to 
R&D.  R&D efforts will result in a larger availability of intermediate products and a 
higher marginal product for capital.  Freer trade allows firms to specialise in the 
intermediate products where they have comparative advantage.  Other authors, such 
as Edwards (1993), have devised models, showing that free trade permits greater 
transfers of technology from developed to developing countries.  Very recently, Coe 
et al. (1995) have shown that even though governments in developing countries may 
not support R&D themselves, they can still enjoy the products of R&D done in 
industrial countries through the medium of inter-affiliate transfers from parent to 
subsidiaries. They found that “a developing country’s total factor productivity is 
larger the greater is its foreign R&D capital stock, the more open it is to trade with 
the industrial countries, and the more educated is its labour force. The foreign R&D 
capital stock only affects productivity when interacted with the import share. The 
estimated elasticities suggest that R&D spillovers from the North to the South are 
significant and substantial”. Hejazi and Safarian (1996) used the same approach to 
show that R&D spillovers flow from  FDI. 
Although growth models do not directly address the issue of foreign 
investment, it is not difficult to see how liberalisation of investment regimes can 
produce parallel results with liberalisation of trade.  All of these models depend to 
some degree on indigenous production of R&D in developing countries.  If one adds 
the assumption that foreign investment carries a greater initial capacity to generate 
R&D and that innovations are diffused throughout developing countries at a greater 
rate in the presence of foreign firms, then foreign investment is bound to accelerate 
the process of attaining  higher long run equilibrium growth rates.  
What remains to be done, of course, is to put these theories to rigorous 
empirical tests.  However, as Edwards (1993) points out, most empirical testing of 
theories about growth are based on cross-section data that has inherent limitations 
when it comes to drawing out inferences about behaviour over time.  Some analysis 
of the effects of foreign investment over prolonged periods of time has begun, but 
still is in its infancy.  Bajo-Rubio et al. (1993, p. 104) found, for example, that 
“foreign direct investment [was] one of the main factors underlying the strong Stephen Guisinger  414 
growth rates experienced by the Spanish economy for the last thirty years”. Although 
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero do not explore in detail the investment regimes 
under which foreign direct investment entered Spain during the period studied, it is 
clear from their narrative that Spain underwent several liberalisation’s that made 
increasing levels of foreign direct investment possible.   
 
SIMULATING INVESTMENT LIBERALISATION 
The second major alternative available to examine the macroeconomic effects 
of investment liberalisation is simulation through large-scale models.  One such 
simulation model is IC95, a multi-region multi-sector model of the world economy 
designed to examine the short-run and long-run effects of economic policies [Dee, 
Geisler and Watts (1996)]. IC95 is a hybrid model based on the SALTER model 
developed by the Industry Commission in Australia and the Global Trade Analysis 
Project Model at Purdue University. 
All simulation models have their strengths and weaknesses that follow from 
the way they are structured. For example, the IC95 model does not track the 
economy through time. Instead, it compares alternative states of the economy at a 
single point in time. IC95 is a system of non-linear equations that describe the 
interactions between major regions of the world. IC95 does not permit national 
exchange rates within each region to vary; instead the region’s exchange rate 
(national rates within the region are fixed) moves against an international standard 
(such as Special Drawing Rights). 
Capital accumulation and international capital mobility in IC95 is based on the 
treatment of capital in IC95 proposed by McDougall (1993). McDougall’s 
contribution was to add equations that enabled simulations to be run, permitting 
capital to accumulate out of increased household savings and corporate profits. The 
essence of capital accumulation is, of course, a change in wealth over time. The 
McDougall (1993) extension to IC95 involves an artificial step of solving the capital 
accumulation and mobility equations outside of the model, using certain assumptions 
about the time paths of the explanatory variables inside the model. The model 
assumes a representative international financial intermediary. Foreign income 
recipients are not taxed. To incorporate withholding taxes would require an 
additional equation that explained the timing and rate of income repatriation. The 
IC95 model includes tax rates for land, domestic capital and households.  
Bora and Guisinger (1996) have used the IC95 model to explore the 
implications of foreign direct liberalisation in Asia. Bora and Guisinger examine 
examples of three runs of the IC95 model. Investment liberalisation produces an 
initial “shock” to the system, in this case represented by foreign direct investment 
raising the stock of host country capital. This increased capital stock produces higher Effects of the Foreign Direct Investment Liberalisation 
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real wages and higher returns to land. In order to capture the strength of linkages 
between investment and trade, the model was run using two different data sets, both 
benchmarked on 1992 data.  First, a 1992 trade data set was used without updates 
reflecting Uruguay Round or the North American Free Trade Area effects. The 
second data set updates the 1992 data with these new developments.  The purpose of 
the two runs is to give us an insight into the complementarity of trade and investment 
liberalisation. 
The results tend to parallel the findings of studies of trade liberalisation.  The 
real values of exports and imports increase, though for exports at a faster rate, 
sometimes significantly so.  Because of the closed nature of the model, there are no 
balance of payments effects because any trade surplus is offset by changes in net 
foreign income and net capital inflows.  Consumer prices fall or remain unchanged in 
most countries, though in a few countries inflation increases.  The IC95 model does 
not allow for fiscal effects because government expenditures are always met by 
revenues.  There is a terms of trade effect associated with the capital transfer, as 
prices in the capital-importing countries fall, but rise in capital-exporting countries. 
When the size of the capital transfers increases, these features become more 
pronounced. In sum, foreign investment liberalisation in the IC95 model is not a 
painless procedure but the pain seems limited and low in relation to benefits.   
 
SHOULD PAKISTAN LIBERALISE? 
Nothing in the preceding review supports the notion that investment 
liberalisation is either destabilising or anti-growth.  Pakistan should experience few 
costs and considerable benefits from continued liberalisation.  This would entail 
removing the remaining performance requirements, such as the deletion requirements 
in the automobile industry, and freeing investment in the service sector. The 
government has removed the major hurdles placed in the way of foreign investors, 
such as negative lists.  Removing the few remaining barriers would put Pakistan in 
the elite club of developing countries that have adopted the free movement of direct 
investment.   
Now is the time for completing the liberalisation of foreign direct investment. 
A poll of Asian executives conducted by the Far Eastern Economic Review in 
August, 1997 found that 92 percent of respondents rated India a better location for 
investment than Pakistan.  The Board of Investment has set a target of a US$3 billion 
inflow of foreign direct investment in the year 2000, a substantial increase over the 
roughly US$1 billion received in 1995-96. To achieve this goal, Pakistan must step 
up its liberalisation process. Pakistan is currently negotiating a bilateral investment 
treaty with the United States.  Now is certainly the time to move toward complete 
liberalisation. Stephen Guisinger  416 
Complete liberalisation would also permit Pakistan to take a leadership 
position in forging a multilateral agreement on investment. A leadership position on 
such an agreement would signal to investors around the world the government’s 
commitment to the free movement of capital and help Pakistan achieve the type of 
policy credibility that Aricanli and Rodrik argued that Turkey lacked.     
The OECD’s purpose in proposing the MAI outside of the WTO framework is 
to ensure that the investment disciplines negotiated would be of the same high 
standard that OECD member countries enjoy.  Negotiations among OECD members 
have reached a standstill, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are 
uncertainties on how to integrate environmental and labour concerns into the 
agreement. The OECD believes that, once negotiated, the agreement will appeal to 
developing countries, such as Pakistan, because of the large increases in foreign 
direct investment that would follow its adoption.   
Foreign direct investment is no panacea and will not solve Pakistan’s resource 
gap by itself.  Even if additional FDI inflows were to add only a small fraction to the 
growth rate, this is no reason to ignore or belittle its contribution.  If Pakistan were to 
find a dozen such small measures, each raising the growth rate by .1 of one percent, a 
full percentage point could be added to per capita growth. 
If Pakistan takes the next and final step to complete its liberalisation, why not 
sign the MAI or, if not the MAI, become a proponent in the WTO for a similar 
multilateral agreement?  I see only benefits and few costs for Pakistan. 
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What are the macroeconomic effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
liberalisation on developing countries that have yet to substantially and fully 
liberalise?  Dr Guisinger’s response is that there is lack of empirical evidence to 
answer this question.  He goes on to survey the substantial evidence accumulated 
from OECD, NBER, and World Bank studies on trade liberalisation which generally 
show favourable effects on growth.  He also looks at a case study of Turkey’s 
attempts at liberalisation of trade and investment.  Finally, he informs us about the 
favourable effects of  foreign direct investment liberalisation in simulations that he 
did for Asia using IC95, a multi-region multi-sector model.  Based on the favourable 
growth experience of trade liberalisation for most countries and his simulation 
experiments with the IC95 model, Dr Guisinger concludes that Pakistan should 
experience few costs and considerable benefits from continued investment 
liberalisation. 
Dr Guisinger asserts that one of the major reasons for the lack of empirical 
studies of foreign direct liberalisation has been the lack of a comprehensive 
quantitative measure of the restrictiveness of investment regimes.  He is emphatic in 
making this point.  However, a look at the international corporate finance literature 
reveals that there are several indexes of country risk available. These are 
comprehensive indexes which incorporate economic, financial, and political risks in 
various countries.  Given that these measures of country risk are employed routinely 
by multinational companies in their capital budgeting exercises involving foreign 
direct investment implies their immediate relevance. International banks have their 
own indexes of country risk based on political and financial risk factors. One of the 
assignments that I gave my graduate students regularly in my international corporate 
finance courses was to come up with comprehensive quantitative measures of 
country risk. 
The case study on Turkey is interesting and perhaps instructive for Pakistan.  In 
spite of an intensification of foreign investment liberalisation by Turkey, in 1985-86, 
which involved the elimination of all “conceivable disincentives” to foreign investment, 
no capital flowed in.  This reminds me of the saying, “suppose you gave a party and no 
one came”. The reason attributed to this lack of FDI in Turkey was that the policy 
measures lacked credibility, given that there was constant tinkering with tariffs, tax rates, 
controls, and other measures. At present, there is a great deal of talk in Pakistan about 
FDI liberalisation and what a great place Pakistan is for FDI and how FDI will solve all 
our economic problems. However, a poll of Asian Executives conducted by the Far 
Eastern Economic Review in August 1997 found that 92 percent of the respondents rated 




I think efforts are misplaced in looking at the effects of FDI liberalisation on 
growth in Pakistan.  It is not as if MNCs are waiting at the border to rush in with FDI 
once we decide that the effects will be positive.  The questions that we should be 
answering objectively are: Why will foreign capital flow into Pakistan? Where will it 
come from?  When will this party really begin? I agree with Parvez Hasan and others 
who stress that mobilisation of domestic savings is more important than relying on 
FDI to solve all our economic problems.   
It is useful to remind ourselves of some elementary principles of international 
corporate finance. FDI moves to countries which offer the highest country risk- and 
exchange risk-adjusted rates of returns.  It flows to high growth economies. There 
are other less risky alternatives open to MNCs than setting up shop in the host 
country.  These are exporting, licensing a host country enterprise, joint ventures, etc. 
There is no consensus on why FDI happens but we can learn from case studies of 
MNCs and other countries.  It is high time that we development economists looked at 
the literature on FDI in international corporate finance. 
Talking again about indicators, it would be silly to expect FDI in Pakistan 
when domestic investment languishes, when property rights are not secure, and when 
capital flight occurs.  There are many Pakistani expatriates in the Middle East and 
the U.S.A. who are willing and able to invest in Pakistan. They even have a 
comparative advantage being familiar with the local language, customs, and modes 
of doing business.  It would be instructive to know why they hesitate. 
The paper talks about the favourable factors that helped in trade liberalisation.  
These are political stability, sustainability of liberalisation, economic fundamentals 
being correct, competition, stronger reforms, and policy sequencing and credibility.  
If all these factors were in place, I believe that Pakistan would be on a course of self-
sustaining high economic growth. In these circumstances, FDI would take care of 
itself and we would not have to worry about why FDI is or is not happening or 
whether its effects are positive.   
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